Reading The Fantastic Four: First Steps through the politics of the AI age, this essay examines how private technological power turns competence into authority. The film’s penthouse family becomes a model of supranational technocracy, while nation-states remain as territorial hosts, logistical partners and implementation layers for systems designed elsewhere.

Originally published on 11 January 2026. Lightly edited for this portfolio in July 2026.
Major spoilers ahead.
The contemporary Hollywood blockbuster has become a surprisingly useful laboratory for political imagination. Beneath the collapsing skylines, extraterrestrial visitors and cosmic machinery, these films quietly experiment with different answers to a very earthly question: when existing institutions appear too slow, fragmented or intellectually exhausted to confront a planetary crisis, who should be trusted to act in their place? The Fantastic Four: First Steps offers an unusually clear answer. In the film, the world is not rescued by a national government, a military coalition or a broad democratic movement, but by a technologically superior family operating from the penthouse of a privately controlled tower. Nations continue to exist, flags remain visible and public authorities still provide much of the logistical machinery, yet the meaningful political agency has already migrated elsewhere.
The Fantastic Four resemble less a conventional superhero team than a compact fusion of family dynasty, research laboratory, technology company and supranational government. They do not derive their authority from elections, legal office or a publicly negotiated mandate. They are permitted to govern because they possess capabilities that ordinary institutions do not, and because the dangers confronting the planet appear too complex and immediate to tolerate the cumbersome rituals of democratic deliberation. Their legitimacy is therefore technical before it is political. They know what to do, they have the machinery required to do it, and everyone else is expected to organise themselves around the solution.
This structure feels particularly recognisable in the age of artificial intelligence, when a small number of private companies increasingly present themselves not merely as software providers but as the future architects of education, medicine, scientific discovery, economic abundance, national security and human coordination itself. Governments may provide land for data centres, energy for model training, subsidies for semiconductor factories, permits for infrastructure and regulations for local deployment, yet the deeper architecture of the technology remains privately designed. The model weights, training priorities, interface logic, safety assumptions and long-term ambitions are determined inside a handful of corporate headquarters, most of them located in the United States. States retain territorial authority, but the systems through which society is increasingly reorganised arrive from elsewhere.
First Steps takes this emerging arrangement and translates it into the warm, colourful language of the superhero family. The political centre of this world is not parliament or the United Nations, but the Baxter Building. The future is planned upstairs.
The Fantastic Four represent a notable departure from the solitary individualism that defined many twentieth-century heroes. The classic action protagonist was usually a rogue figure who operated outside the system because the system had become timid, corrupt or incompetent. His authority was intensely personal and generally temporary. He broke the rules, defeated the immediate threat and then disappeared, allowing the ordinary social order to reassemble itself once the emergency had passed.
The Fantastic Four are not temporary outsiders. They possess laboratories, specialised infrastructure, public prestige, scientific authority and a permanent position above the city. Their headquarters is at once a home, a research institute, a command centre and an unofficial seat of global administration. The family does not simply intervene when civilisation falters; it maintains the standing capacity to observe, diagnose and reorganise civilisation whenever necessary. This is no longer the fantasy of a lone individual escaping bureaucracy, but the fantasy of a privately organised network becoming more operationally important than bureaucracy itself.
Their family structure makes this concentration of power emotionally palatable. A corporation of equally vast influence might appear cold, extractive or authoritarian, whereas the Fantastic Four are affectionate, quarrelsome, vulnerable and recognisably domestic. Their immense technological authority is softened by breakfast-table conversations, pregnancies, sibling irritation and marital tenderness. The penthouse is a command centre, but it is also a home, and the home lends moral warmth to the command centre. The family’s private interests and the planet’s public interests gradually become so intertwined that protecting one begins to feel indistinguishable from protecting the other.
The team’s powers reinforce this political structure, not as rigid one-to-one symbols, but as an unusually coherent vocabulary of elite agency. Taken together, they represent mobility, privacy, resilience and systemic flexibility, precisely the capacities through which contemporary high-status actors navigate an increasingly complex and tightly regulated world.
Johnny Storm’s pyrokinesis and flight embody a form of frictionless vertical mobility. Roads, borders, queues, public transport systems and terrestrial infrastructure barely register for him. He rises above them, crosses enormous distances at extreme speed and eventually breaches the atmosphere itself. His relationship with geography is fundamentally different from that of the ordinary person, whose life remains shaped by local wages, national jurisdictions, physical commuting and the stubborn resistance of distance.
Johnny therefore belongs to what might be called the orbital class, a group whose social perspective is defined by the height and speed at which it can operate. In contemporary life, private aviation already offers a milder version of this detachment. The private jet does not merely reduce travel time; it also rearranges the experience of geography. Borders become administrative details, cities become interchangeable nodes and distance becomes an inconvenience largely absorbed by money. Private space travel extends the same logic upward, transforming the atmosphere itself from a natural boundary into another premium layer of mobility.
This is why the comparison is not simply decorative. Johnny’s power represents a recognisable form of elite freedom: the ability to move above the infrastructures that organise everyone else. From that altitude, the world appears integrated, fluid and manageable. Local frictions become difficult to perceive because one rarely has to remain inside them for long. His perspective is global in the most literal sense, although global vision can also produce a peculiar blindness. The higher one rises, the easier it becomes to see the planet as a unified system and the harder it becomes to notice the dense, uneven textures through which most people actually inhabit it.
Sue Storm’s invisibility and force-field generation represent another central privilege of contemporary power: control over exposure. In an environment of permanent digital surveillance, where ordinary citizens are increasingly visible to governments, employers, platforms, insurers and advertisers, invisibility becomes an exceptional asset. The powerful person is not necessarily the person everyone sees, but the person who can decide when visibility is advantageous and when it becomes intrusive. Public attention can be cultivated for influence and withdrawn from when scrutiny grows uncomfortable.
Sue possesses this capacity in almost perfect form. She can disappear from the public field while remaining fully capable of shaping it, and she can construct protected spaces within which the family becomes physically inaccessible to external pressure. Her force fields create a private square inside the public one, a secured zone from which society can be observed, managed and occasionally rescued without surrendering the privacy enjoyed by those performing the rescue.
The metaphor resembles the protective architecture surrounding modern wealth: private legal entities, encrypted networks, gated compounds, tax structures, protected data environments and carefully managed public identities. These mechanisms do not remove powerful actors from society. They allow them to participate under selectively favourable conditions, exerting influence while limiting reciprocal exposure. Sue’s power is therefore not simply invisibility, but selective legibility. She decides which boundaries remain permeable and which become impenetrable. In a world where most people are increasingly transparent to systems they cannot inspect in return, that asymmetry constitutes a form of private sovereignty.
Ben Grimm provides the dynasty with mass, durability and consequence absorption. The Rock, inexplicably not played by Dwayne Johnson, can withstand the physical shocks that would destroy a more delicate body. He functions as the family’s resilience layer, absorbing impact so that its intellectual and strategic operations can continue without interruption.
His power recalls the institutional bulk that allows large organisations to survive market crashes, legal disputes, political backlash and technological failure. Powerful institutions are rarely invulnerable because they never make mistakes, but because they possess enough capital, legal support, reputation and infrastructural weight to absorb those mistakes without collapsing. A failed decision that would destroy a smaller organisation becomes a temporary inconvenience for one protected by sufficient scale.
Ben personifies this capacity. He turns structural weight into security, ensuring that the more experimental members of the family can pursue ambitious plans without remaining fully exposed to the immediate consequences of failure. He is the corporeal expression of being too important, too embedded or simply too large to disappear.
Reed Richards represents a more supple form of power. His body stretches, narrows and reshapes itself around obstacles rather than confronting them directly. He rarely needs to break a structure when he can discover how flexible the structure already is. His physical elasticity mirrors the legal, technical and jurisdictional ingenuity through which modern institutions move across supposedly rigid systems.
Complex regulations, tax codes, national boundaries and administrative procedures often appear fixed from the outside, yet they contain innumerable seams, exceptions and interpretive spaces that become visible to those with sufficient expertise. Reed’s gift is precisely this ability to locate and inhabit the seam. Much as he can reach through a narrow opening and solve a problem from the other side, technologically sophisticated organisations can stretch across jurisdictions, reorganise their formal shape and preserve the appearance of compliance while pursuing outcomes that ordinary participants could never access.
Together, the four powers create a nearly complete model of contemporary elite agency. Johnny escapes geography. Sue controls visibility. Ben absorbs consequences. Reed adapts the rules. Their extraordinary capacity does not rest on one heroic quality but on the smooth coordination of several mutually reinforcing privileges.
The most revealing member of this political dynasty, however, is Franklin Richards. The original Fantastic Four obtained their powers through an accident involving extreme risk, preserving at least some connection to the American mythology of entrepreneurial merit. They crossed a dangerous frontier, suffered the consequences and returned transformed. Their authority can therefore be narrated as the reward for courage, experimentation and first-generation risk-taking.
Franklin inherits the result. This is the moment when meritocracy hardens into dynasty. What the parents had to risk their lives to obtain, the child receives as a biological condition. His exceptional position does not emerge from labour, sacrifice or exposure to risk, but from birth inside an already extraordinary family. The film does not treat this inheritance as a political embarrassment or an awkward contradiction. It presents Franklin’s inherited power as the next stage of planetary possibility.
The Baxter Building penthouse provides the appropriate environment for such an heir. Franklin is raised inside a controlled world of advanced science, limitless attention and extraordinary intellectual resources, physically elevated above the crowded and unpredictable social environment below. His isolation is not framed as deprivation but optimisation. The suggestion is familiar from contemporary elite education and parenting: exceptional potential must be protected from institutional mediocrity, unnecessary friction and the noisy compromises of ordinary social life.
The image of Franklin reading Darwin at the age of four makes the evolutionary subtext unusually explicit. He is not simply gifted; he appears as a developmental leap, a child whose biological inheritance seems to justify a new form of social authority. His family’s position no longer looks like an accidental concentration of power. It begins to resemble nature’s decision.
Franklin thus becomes a kind of market messiah, produced within the highest-fidelity private environment and presented as the solution to problems that conventional society cannot solve. The family’s authority is no longer justified only by what it has achieved, but by what its lineage may become. The first generation built the platform. The second generation is born as its native intelligence.
Sue’s temporary death during childbirth sharpens this dynastic logic into something more overtly political. If the mother can be read as a figure for the nurturing state, the public institution that protects, educates and sustains collective life, then her death marks the temporary collapse of the old social contract at the precise moment a more concentrated form of private power is born. Franklin can only emerge after the maternal order has exhausted itself, as though the inherited structures of public care must briefly give way before a new level of individual capacity can enter the world. Yet the film does not leave the mother dead. Franklin resurrects her, and this reversal is crucial: private technological power may render the state secondary, but it does not make the state useless. It still requires the state as physical shelter, legal buffer, territorial host and implementation layer. The mother returns, but her role has changed. She no longer appears as the original source of social order; she is restored by the child whose power now exceeds her own and whose continued existence she is expected to support. In this sense, the sequence condenses the film’s entire political model into one intimate event: the nation-state dies as sovereign architect, then returns as the indispensable body through which privately organised power can operate at planetary scale. In that moment, the family has become infrastructure.
The film’s climax reveals what this new social order means for everyone outside the Baxter Building. Faced with Galactus and the literal consumption of Earth, the Fantastic Four devise an immense technological solution involving a globally distributed network of teleportation machines. The plan requires materials, labour, engineering capacity and territorial cooperation from states across the world, yet the political process through which such a decision might ordinarily be debated has almost completely disappeared. The nations of the world are not genuine co-authors of the strategy, but their implementation layer.
The Future Foundation designs the machines, determines the global architecture, calculates the deployment points and distributes the necessary instructions. Sovereign governments organise local construction, secure the relevant territory and mobilise the resources required to execute the plan. They retain enormous administrative responsibility, yet they exercise remarkably little control over the underlying technological system.
The arrangement closely resembles the emerging relationship between nation-states and the largest technology companies on this planet. Governments may approve the construction of a data centre, negotiate access to electricity and water, subsidise semiconductor production, build transport connections or establish local compliance requirements. What they generally do not control is the foundational architecture of the model being deployed, the principles according to which it was trained, the design of its interfaces or the strategic intentions of the private organisation that owns it. The state thus becomes the territorial host of a technological order designed elsewhere.
This does not mean states have become irrelevant. Their energy grids, laws, police forces, educational systems, public finances and physical territories remain indispensable. Yet indispensability is not the same as authorship. A country may supply the land, power, labour and institutional stability upon which a system depends while possessing little meaningful influence over what that system is ultimately built to become.
In First Steps, this political imbalance is rendered almost frictionless because the emergency is so immense and the Fantastic Four’s competence so obvious. No one seriously debates whether the Earth should be moved. There is no prolonged diplomatic process, no meaningful public referendum and barely any ideological disagreement over the appropriate response. The danger is approaching, the family possesses the only plausible solution and deliberation would merely consume time.
Politics is then displaced by the design sprint. The world becomes a single integrated project, while sovereign countries resemble regional deployment teams working from specifications produced at headquarters. The Future Foundation effectively supersedes the United Nations without formally replacing it. It does not need to abolish diplomacy because it renders diplomacy operationally secondary. Technical execution becomes the primary mandate, and national difference survives mainly as a logistical consideration within a planetary system designed from above.
This is the deeper political fantasy of the film: that the complexity of contemporary crises may eventually exceed the bandwidth of democratic governance, leaving privately organised technological institutions as the only actors capable of responding at the required speed and scale.
The resemblance to contemporary AI ideology is difficult to overlook. The leading AI companies increasingly describe their technology in civilisational terms. Artificial intelligence is expected to accelerate medical research, personalise education, eliminate tedious labour, optimise energy systems, strengthen defence, increase scientific productivity and eventually generate a form of abundance broad enough to transform the foundations of economic life.
These promises may not be entirely empty. The technology is genuinely powerful, and the organisations developing it often possess concentrations of capital, computing capacity and specialised talent that most governments cannot easily reproduce. This is precisely what makes their political ascent persuasive. They are not becoming influential because they have convinced the public that they deserve ceremonial status. They are becoming influential because they can build systems that states increasingly believe they cannot afford to lack. Technical effectiveness quietly becomes permission.
The Fantastic Four embody this new source of legitimacy. They do not overthrow public institutions, declare themselves rulers or demand ideological loyalty. They simply acquire such overwhelming problem-solving capacity that government begins to reorganise itself around their existence. Their authority grows not through conquest but through dependency. Every crisis they resolve becomes another argument for granting them greater freedom during the next one.
The public accepts this arrangement because the family’s promises are repeatedly fulfilled. The world is genuinely threatened. The machines genuinely work. The heroes genuinely care. The political problem is therefore more subtle than the familiar story of a malicious elite deceiving an innocent population. The Fantastic Four are benevolent, capable and often correct. Their lack of democratic accountability is softened by the fact that democratic institutions appear incapable of matching their speed or intelligence.
This is also the seduction surrounding private AI governance. The strongest argument for concentrated technological power is not that private companies possess a moral right to redesign society, but that they may become the only institutions with the operational capacity to do so effectively. The more indispensable their systems become, the more regulation can be framed as obstruction, deliberation as delay and public scepticism as a failure to comprehend the scale of the opportunity.
The political transformation occurs almost politely as states do not vanish, but become interfaces. Governments do not surrender sovereignty in one dramatic ceremony; they exchange pieces of it for access, investment, infrastructure and the hope of remaining technologically relevant. The hierarchy is less announced than crystallised through a sequence of apparently practical decisions.
What makes this arrangement emotionally attractive is that the Fantastic Four do not resemble distant technocrats. They are warm, photogenic, humorous and sincerely devoted to one another. Their family life translates planetary management into a language of care. The world is not being administered by an anonymous committee but protected by people whose domestic intimacy the audience has been invited to share.
The penthouse therefore becomes a comforting political symbol. Its elevation signifies distance from ordinary life, but also perspective. The family can see the whole picture because it is not trapped inside the confusion below. Its privilege appears functional rather than decadent, justified by the clarity, expertise and protective capacity that privilege supposedly enables.
In the meantime, the public is gradually recast from a body of citizens into the clientele of a benevolent global manager. People contribute labour, resources and cooperation, but they do not meaningfully participate in designing the future toward which those resources are directed. They experience the security provided by the system without possessing corresponding authority over its architecture.
This is not quite dictatorship, because coercion remains secondary. Nor is it democracy, because collective self-government has been replaced by managed participation. It is closer to a technologically mediated guardianship, where a highly capable private elite promises safety, abundance and planetary coordination in exchange for broad discretion over the systems through which those benefits are delivered. The old nation state promised representation, while the penthouse promises competence.
That exchange may become increasingly tempting in a world of climate instability, geopolitical paralysis, ageing institutions and accelerating technological change. When public systems appear unable to coordinate even modest reforms, the idea that a small group of unusually gifted people might simply build around them can feel less like authoritarianism than relief.
The Fantastic Four: First Steps captures this desire with unusual clarity. Its heroes do not seize the world from governments; they inherit the world’s trust by repeatedly becoming the only people capable of saving it. Their authority is private, dynastic and technologically concentrated, yet it remains emotionally wrapped in the language of family, care and collective survival.
The film’s political fantasy is therefore not simply that clever people should govern. It is that planetary complexity has made private technocracy both necessary and desirable. Governments survive as territorial administrators, logistical partners and public-facing interfaces, while the architecture of the future is designed by a small, self-contained group whose mandate rests on capability, velocity and the promise of abundance.
The unsettling part is not that this world appears entirely fictional. Beyond the costumes, retro-futurist machinery and cosmic appetite of Galactus, its institutional outline is already becoming all too familiar. The penthouse does not need to conquer the street below. It only needs to build the systems the street can no longer imagine living without. ■